The Strategy of Waiting: Almada's 10-24 Day Rule and América's Two Silent Center-Backs

I have been following every jornada of Club América since the start of the season. Ten weeks have passed and six new faces have arrived—but two names have not appeared in any official match. Santiago Ramos Mingo. Santiago Bueno. One Argentine, one Uruguayan—both center-backs. The media headline asks a mild question: "Will they have to wait even longer?" I set this question on a table next to the data of the previous four signings. Perea waited 13 days. Cerrillo waited 10. Borja waited 24. Álvarez waited 14. Suddenly the picture changes. The question stops being "why the delay" and becomes "Almada has built a method, and we are calling it a crisis." When Guillermo Almada joined Club América, his reputation was already established as a structured coach. Organizing the team, selecting players, and above all—a specific protocol for integrating new signings. This semester he has made six signings. Perea came from Ligue 1 in France—an attacking player. Cerrillo arrived from MLS—a Mexican-American. Borja came from the UAE—a Colombian striker. Álvarez came from Spain. And practically at the close of the transfer window, with Liga MX's transfer calculations nearly shutting down, two center-backs entered the squad—Santiago Ramos Mingo (Argentina) and Santiago Bueno (Uruguay). What is known about Almada's adaptation process: he gives every new signing a window of 10 to 24 days. During this time, the player trains with the squad, absorbs tactical instructions, and brings fitness levels to match rhythm. Only then comes the official debut. He makes no exceptions—Perea waited 13 days, Cerrillo debuted in just 10, Borja had to sit the longest at 24 days, and Álvarez took the field after 14 days. This is not a random decision; this is a method. Now, when we match this pattern with the situation of the two new center-backs, we see they are moving toward a wait of approximately 29 days. If they debut on October 10 against Monterrey, it will be the longest adaptation period of the semester. Even Borja's 24-day record would be broken. The question is—is this delay actually a bad thing? Or have we become trapped in a media-created frame and misread the system? I want to analyze this in three layers. First layer: positional reality. Center-back is a position where collective coordination matters more than individual skill. Throwing in a striker is comparatively easy—he just needs to receive the ball and finish. A winger can change a match's momentum in a 15-minute cameo. But a center-back? His work begins before the ball arrives. He needs to know when to step forward, when to hold position, when to set the offside trap. His communication with the goalkeeper, his covering with the full-backs, his passing lanes with the midfielders—all of this is intertwined like a network. The pace of Liga MX, the movements of opposition strikers, the atmosphere of venues—these are unknown territory for new players. When Almada is integrating two players in this position together, the time inevitably lengthens. Because if one center-back takes 24 days, then preparing two together means double coordination, double rehearsal. Second layer: psychological protection. Club América is an ecosystem of pressure. One of Mexico's biggest clubs—expectation of victory in every match, harsh criticism for every mistake. If Almada throws two new center-backs directly into a big match and they err, their career trajectory itself could change. Mexican media can quickly label a player a 'flop', especially when the player is a foreigner. This socio-psychological pressure is real. By making them wait, Almada is protecting them—from media pressure and from the pressure of their own unripe form. He wants them to take the field only when fully prepared, so that the first impression becomes a successful one. Third layer: the FIFA-date friendlies. The upcoming friendlies against Cruz Azul and Chivas are not official debuts—but they are the most rational integration window. There are no points to lose, no changes in the league table. The pressure is comparatively low. For two center-backs, this is the ideal environment to get first minutes. Almada has certainly kept this opportunity ready—he will release them in the friendlies, observe how prepared they are, then decide on an official debut. This is actually a rehearsal—a public rehearsal. Without these friendlies, Almada might have been forced to take risks and throw them directly into an official match. Now I want to open another layer—the club's overall transfer strategy. Looking at América's recruitment pattern this season, one thing becomes clear: the club is trying to acquire players from multiple markets. France, MLS, UAE, Spain, Argentina, Uruguay—six signings from six different geographical regions. This is not random scatter; it is a deliberate strategy. Each market has price variations, quality variations, and also differences in tactical profiles. Perea, who played in Ligue 1, has probably brought a mix of European pace and technique. Cerrillo from MLS is accustomed to physical strength and North American high-pressing football. Borja from the UAE has seen the pace of Asian football. Álvarez from Spain grew up in possession-based football. And now two center-backs from Argentina and Uruguay—bringing South American tactical toughness and a tradition of physical combat. This diversity is giving América strength. But this diversity has a weakness too—each player needs to be understood separately, adapted separately. Almada's 10-24 day protocol is essentially a way to manage this diversity. Now, about the South American pipeline. Liga MX has historically been an attractive destination for South American players. Players from Uruguay, Argentina, Colombia, Brazil can enjoy high salaries and competitive football in Liga MX without going to Europe's big leagues. América is exploiting this pipeline. Ramos Mingo and Bueno are continuations of this tradition. But the question is—were they brought in for an urgent need, or as part of a long-term plan? If there is an urgent problem in the defensive line and these two players were brought as the solution, then a 29-day wait signals a problem. But if this is part of a long-term defensive rebuild—Almada building a defensive line where these two center-backs will be the foundation of the future—then the wait is entirely logical. Stage-1 information does not clarify this role, so I cannot say anything with certainty here. But as an observer, I would say Almada generally thinks long-term. Now let me go to the place where I want to step outside the mainstream. We are all talking about the delay, but the real risk is the October 10 Monterrey match. Suppose Almada, after 29 days of waiting, throws both new center-backs in together. Monterrey—a direct rival, possibly one of the title favorites, a high-pressure match. Two players who still do not fully know the pace of Liga MX, the characteristics of opposition players, the venue environment. Throwing them in together means exponentially increasing the risk of disorganization. One center-back error becomes a goal; two center-backs erring together becomes a disaster. If Almada is wise, he might field one and bench the other—or bench both and wait one more week. But after a 29-day wait, making them wait even longer will intensify media pressure. Another important issue: there is no financial data in this story. Transfer fee, contract length, wage structure—nothing is reported. Two players arriving at the close of the transfer window may have come on loan or free transfers—this is a common late-window pattern. But it is not confirmed. Another possibility: the delay could be caused by non-tactical factors such as registration paperwork, visas, or physical testing. Their debut may be stuck not in Almada's instructions but in the club's administrative process. Criticizing without this information is unreasonable. We must not mistake the absence of information for the absence of risk—but at the same time, we should not make accusations without information. Liga MX's calendar is another relevant issue. The structure of this league is peculiar—a season split into Apertura and Clausura phases. Each phase has 17 jornadas, followed by the Liguilla (playoffs). This structure means every match carries immeasurable importance. Losing one match means a worse playoff position. Almada is working in an environment where experimentation has little room. That is why his adaptation protocol is so important—a wrong debut decision can break the entire season's plan. The FIFA-date friendlies are therefore not just convenient; they are almost necessary. Let me say something about the media narrative. This story is soft news, not investigative or crisis-oriented. "Will they have to wait longer?"—this headline is curious, not hostile. The headline actually creates an expectation gap—supporters want a quick debut, but Almada's protocol says wait. This gap created the story. But there is a weakness—the source reliability of this report is limited. No named journalist, no official club statement, one Almada quote from a second-hand source. This source tier should be kept in mind. If I look at the overall risk matrix, the primary risk is sporting. Two center-backs have not yet played, they arrived at the close of the transfer window, and a possible debut is against a strong opponent. The friendlies will reduce this risk—first minutes in a controlled environment. The second risk is the public narrative. If the delay continues past October 10 without explanation, the story can shift from 'patience' to 'problem'. The third risk is that financial assessment is impossible—no fee, wage, or contract data. However, there is also no indication of any specific financial danger. Let me share a tactical observation. I have been analyzing matches for ten years—a center-back's integration period actually depends on the team's playing style. If the team plays a high line and uses the offside trap, adaptation for a new center-back is difficult—because he must learn when to break the line, when to hold. If the team plays a deep defensive line, the task is easier. We do not know Almada's preference—no information about formation, pressing structure, or build-up patterns. But it can be said that if Almada believes in a complex tactical system—and his character suggests that—then teaching that complexity to two new center-backs will take time. This is where the real explanation of the 29-day wait may be hidden. I have another important question: should the adaptation protocol be equal for all positions? The way Almada made Perea (attacking) and Borja (striker) wait up to 24 days suggests his protocol is position-neutral. But my analysis suggests defenders should receive even more time—compared to attacking players. A center-back's coordination error directly becomes a goal; a striker's missed chance only creates frustration. I want to know how Almada views this asymmetry. Perhaps his protocol is actually more flexible—a 10-24 day range for all players, within which decisions are made based on position, physical condition, and mental readiness. Another interesting aspect: both players share the name Santiago. Ramos Mingo and Bueno—two center-backs, same name, same position, arrived almost simultaneously. This is a coincidence, but it gives media a fascinating angle for storytelling. A 'The Two Santiagos' framing could spark supporter curiosity. But when curiosity turns into restlessness, pressure builds. Almada must manage that too. Now let us look ahead. Over the next two weeks, watch four things. First, whether Ramos Mingo or Bueno get minutes in the FIFA-date friendlies—that will be the first signal of their readiness. Second, whether the names of these two players come up in Almada's press conferences—that will indicate internal expectations. Third, whether they appear in the official squad list for October 10—that will be the conclusive proof. Fourth, América's recent results—if the team is losing, if the defensive line shows problems, Almada may be forced to make an early debut, breaking his protocol. To me, this is a planned wait. The data says so. Perea 13, Cerrillo 10, Borja 24, Álvarez 14—these four points create a line, and at the end of that line stand the two Santiagos. Almada is not doing anything different for them; what he is doing is a continuation of his own system. But the success of this system depends on two uncertain variables—whether the players can adapt quickly, and whether the team's results will support this patience. Many systems in football history have failed when results did not arrive on time. The wait for the two Santiagos may end within a week, or it may become even longer. But that this wait is part of a method—Almada's data makes that clear. The question is whether the media and supporters will have the patience to understand that method. I will have it, because I know that in football the value of the right decision is greater than the value of the fast decision. And making the right decision takes time—especially when the future of your defensive line rests in the hands of two Santiagos.